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CHINA:

10:30 a.m., MST

RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT

Viet Nam is heavy on the heart of the nation.
Vietnamese war is a tragedy.
lives which it claims .

The

It is a tragedy in the American

It is a tragedy in the death and devasta-

tlon which, in the name of salvation, it has spread throughout
Viet Nam.
My views on United States policy respecting Viet
Nam are no secret.

I have stated them, restated them, and

elaborated them many times.

I have cautioned against an ever-

deepening military involvement in that conflict.
to any increase in it today.

I am opposed

I believe that the way out of a

barbarous situation is not to go further into it.
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The fi r st s t ep towards p eace, i n my judgment, is
to concent r ate and consolidate t h e U. S . militar y effort and t o
escalate the peace - effo r t , looking towards the negotiation o f a n
hon o r able end of the conflict.
That, in brief, is the way I feel about Viet Nam .
That is the way I have felt about it for a long time .
dent knows it .

The Senate knows it .

The Presi -

Montana knows it .

What I have to say to you, today, touches only
indi r ectly on Viet Nam .

My remarks are intended to go beyond

Viet Nam to what may well be the roots of the war.
lecture of the

se~ies

In this first

on international affairs, I wish to address

your attention to what is the great void in the foreign relations
of this nation--to the question of China .
As a nation, we have lived

thro~gh

a generation

in only heresay association with a third of the enti r e human race .
At the inception of this void, we were engaged in a costly and
indecisive conflict in Korea--on China ' s northeast frontier .

Two

- 3 -

decades later, we are engaged once again in a costly and indecisive conflict, this time on China's southeast frontier.

These

two great military involvements on the Chinese periphery are not
unrelated to the absence of relevant contact between China and
the United States.
or later a tenuous truce may be achieved

Soone~

in Viet Nam even as a truce ·iA:as achieved in Korea. · In my judg·ment, however, there will be no durable peace in Korea, Viet Nam,
or anywhere else in Asia unles s there is a candi d c onf:rontation
with the problems of the

Si~o-U .

S. relationship.

China needs peac e if the potentials of its culture
are to be realiz ed.

This

natio~

needs peace for the same re ason.

In this day and age, the world needs peace for civilized
You young people have the greatest stake in peace.

s~rvival.

For that

reason, I ask you to look beyond Viet Nam, behind Korea, to what
may well be the core of the failure of peace in Asia -- to the
U. B.-Chinese estrangement of two decades.

- 4 In 1784, Robert Morris, a signer of the Declaration
of Independ2nce, sent the first American clipper ship to trade
with China.

Th2 year that P:;::es ident George Washington took the

oath of office, 1789, fourteen American ships were ridi ng at
anchor in the Pearl River off Canton in South China.
There are no American ships in Chinese ports today.
There have not
hardly an

~een

Americ&~

for almost twenty yea rs.

In t'lfenty years,

doctor, scientist, businessman, journalist,

student, or even a tourist has set foot in China.
Ac::oss ti"le Pacific Ocean,

;·;e

and

-c·~1e

Chinese glare

at one another, uncomprehendingly, apprehensively, and suspiciou.sly.

I:! the 1..i'n i ted Statss, there is fear of the sudden r.1arch

of Chinese armies into Southeast Asia.

In China, there is fear

of a tighter American encirclement ai.1d American nuclear attack.
We see millions
Chinars frontiers.
way.

o~

Chinese soldiers poised on

We see lead2rs who threaten in a most violent

We see an internal Chinese turmoil to confirm our fears of

- 5 -

irrationality and recklessness.

Finally, we see a growing

nuclear power, with the looming spectre of a full-fledged Chinese
intercontinental "ballistic missile force.
On the other hand, the Chinese sec themselves
surrounded by massive American military power.

They see U. S.

naval, grouDd, and air bases scattered through Japan, Korea,
Taiwan, Okinawa, Guam, the Philippines, and Thailand.

They see

over half a million American troops in neighboring Viet Nam and
hundrecs of thct:sa;.J.ds more n·. =arby.

'l'he:T see tremendous nuclear

capability with missiles zeroed in on Chinese cities.

They see

the United Sta.tes as "occupying'' the Chinese island of Taiwan
and supporting a Chir:.ese government 1>'hose declared aim is the
recapture of the mainland,

And they see, too, what they describe

as a growing collusion between the Uni ted States and the SovLet
Uninn, a country which they believe infringes China's borders,
threatens to corrupt the Chinese revolution and exercises an
unwelcome

influe~lce

throughout Asia.

- 6 -

We and the Chinese have not always looked at one
another with such baleful mistrust.

The American images of China

have fluctuated and shifted in an almost cyclical way.

There has

been the image of the China of wisdom, intelligence, industry,
piety, stoicism, and strength.

This is the China of Marco Polo,

Pearl Buck, Charlie Chan,and heroic resistance to the Japanese
during World War II.
On the other hand, there has been the
the China of cruelty, barba=ism,

viole~cc

'

a~d

i~age

of

faceless hordes.

This is the China of drum-head tri::>.ls, summe.ry E:xenttions, ru
Manchu,and the Boxer ReJellion--the China that is
the phrase

11

yellow peril.

su~ed

up in

11

Throughout our history, these two jmages have
alternated) with first one predominant and

the~

the other .

In

the eighteenth century, we looked up to China as an ancient
civilization--superior in many aspects of technology, culture,
and social

orde~

and

surrou~ded

by an air of splendid

myste~y.

- 7 Respect tur ned to contempt, howeve r , with China ' s quick defeat by
the British i n the Opium War of

1840 .

There followed acts o f

humiliation of China such as pa r ticipation in extra- territorial
treaty rights and the Chinese Exclusion Act of

1882 .

Attitudes shifted again in the early twentieth
century to one of benevolence largely in consequence of the influence of missionaries .

There were more missionaries in China from

the Un i ted States than from any other country .

More American

missionaries served in China than anywhere else in the world .

The

Chinese became, for this nation, a guided, guarded, and adored
people .
Chinese resistance to the Japanese invasion in

1937

produced another shift from benevolence to admiration .

At

the end of the Second World War, admiration was displaced by dis appointment and frustration, as the wartime truce between Nationalist and Communist forces collapsed in cataclysmic internal
strife .

This nation became profoundly disenchanted with China, a

disenchantment which was replaced abruptly in

1949

by hostility .

- 8 -

The hostility was largely a reaction, of course,
to the coming to power of a Communist regime on the Chinese mainland.

We did not interpret this event as a consequence of the

massive difficulties and the vast inner weaknesses of a war-torn
China.

Rathe~

we saw it almost as an affront to this nation.

We

saw it as a treacherous extension of the Soviet steam-roller
policies which had reduced Eastern and Central Europe to subservience at the end of World War II.
Then, in 1948, came a Communist coup in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet attempt to blockade Berlin .

The triumph of

a Communist government in China followed immediately after these
events in Europe .

The nation was shaken to its fingertips.

Still, the press of events continued relentlessly.
In June 1950, the North Koreans launched a sudden attack on South
Korea.

The Chinese forces intervened in the war in November of

that year.

The United States was brought into a major military

confrontation in which, for the first time, the Chinese were
enemies and not allies .

- 9 -

After these events, the assumptions of American
policy towards China were revised.

An effort was made to meet

both the concern and outrage respecting China which existed in
this nation and the revolutionary militancy of the new Chinese
regime in Asia.

Policy was cast anew on the premise that the

government on the Chinese mainland was an aggressor which, subject
to directions from Moscow, would use force to impose international
Communism on Asia.

Conversely, it was assumed that if the

endorsement of the free nations were
was said to be

11

with~eld,

this regime which

alien 11 to the Chinese people-- some sort of over-

grown puppet of Moscow--would wither and eventually collapse.
On this basis, recognition was not extended to
Peking.

The official vie1,11 was that the National

Government,

which had retreated to the island of Taiwan, continued to speak
for all of China.

We cut off all trade with the mainland and

did what could be done to encourage other countries to follow
suit.

In a similar fashion, we led a diplomatic campaign year

- 10 -

after year against the seating of the Chinese People's Republic
in the United Nations.

We drew an arc of military alliances on

the seaward side of China and undergirded them with the deployment of massive American military power in bases throughout the
Western Pacific.
Much has happened to call into question the assump tions in which these policies towards China have been rooted.

In

the first place, the People's Republic has shown itself to be
neither a part of a Communist monolith nor a carbon copy of Sov i et
Russia.

The fact is that,of the numerous divisions which have

arisen within the Communist world, the differences between Moscow
and Peking have been the most significant.

They so remain today

although the more rasping edges of the conflict appear somewhat
tempered by the war i n Viet Nam.
At the same time, the government on the mainland
has not only survived, it has provided China with a functioning
leadership.

Unde r its direction, Chi n ese society has achieved a

- ll -

degree of economic and scientific progress, apparently sufficient
for survival of an enormous and growing population and sophisti cated enough to produce thermo - nuclear explosions .
In the last two years, the so- called Cultural
Revolution in China has rekindled what has

bee~

a periodic expecta-

tion that the Peking government is on the verge of collapse and
the way is open for a military return to the mainland of the
National Government on Taiwan .

There seems to be little doubt

that the turmoil in China has caused serious disruptions .

What

appears in conflict in the cultural revolution, however, is not
the Peking structure as such but the adequacy of its ideological
content.

That would be a far cry from the kind of popular revul-

sion which might be expected to open the doors to a new regime .
In any event, the worst of the upheavals within
China appear to have ended months ago, without any irreparable
break in the continuity of the government or the operations of
the economy.

It is ·the height of folly to envision, in

~he
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p r esent sit l a t ion, an occasion for the over throw of the Peking
government by ext ernal military pressu res .

Indeed, what would

be better calcuJ ated to end, overnight, the remaining ferment on
the mainland

~han

a plausible threat to the security of China or

an actual attack on Chinese territory?
If the People's Republic, then, is here to stay,
what of the other assumption on which thj_s nation's policy respecting China has long been based?

~~t

of the assumption that the

Chinese government is an expanding and aggressive force?
it is r estrained from

s~eeping

That

through Asia because we have electe(

to meet its challenge along the 17th Parallel which divides the
Northern and Southern parts of Viet Nam?
In recent years, the present Chinese government
has not shown any great eagerness to use force to spread its
elsewhere in Asia
ideology/although Chinese armies have been employed in assertion
of the traditional borders of China.

To be sure, China has given

enthusiastic encouragement and has promised to support wars of

- 13 national liberation.

However, China has not participated

directly in these wars and support, when it has been forthcoming,
has been limited and circumspect.
In Viet Nam, for example, there is certainly
Chinese encouragement and aid for the North Vietnamese and the
Viet Cong.

Chinese involvement, however, has beenfar more peri-

pheral than our own.

The enemy soldiers with whom we are compeller

to grapple are all Vietnamese and, in fact, mostly South VietnamesE
At every stage of the war, the assistance we have provided to
South Viet Nam has far exceeded the aid from China and from all
outside sources to the Viet Cong and North Viet Nam--both in terms
of men and materiel.

There is Chinese equipment in South Viet

Nam but there are no Chinese battalions.

Even in North Viet Nam,

Chinese manpower is reported to amount, at most, to one-tenth of
our forces in Viet Nam, and the great bulk of these Chinese are
labor troops, some involved in air-defense but most of them
engaged in repairing bomb damage to roads, rai.lroads, bridges,
and the like.

- 14 Chinese actions in Tibet, and along the Himalayan
frontier of India,are often cited as evidence of militant Chinese
Communist aggression .

The fact is, however, that Tibet has been

regarded, for many dec0des, as falling within China's over- all
boundaries.

Not only the Peking government but also the Chinese

National Government on Taiwan insiststhat Tibet belongs to China .
India also acknowledges such to be the case .

Indeed, American

policy has never recognized Tibet as other than Chinese territory .
In the case of the border war with India in 1962,
the Chinese Communists occupied territories which, again, not
only they, but also the Chinese Nationalists, consider to be
Chinese.

It is not precisely characteristj_c of a militant

expansionism, moreover, for a government to withdraw it s military
forces from a territory which they have invested.
government did so
1962

Yet, the Peking

from pa rts of India which were occupied i n

as well as from North Korea .

- 15 As for indirect aggression through economic means,
China has been able to exert only a limited influence, either
through aid or trade.

In Africa and, indeed, in Southeast Asia,

where attempts have been made to use trade and aid for political
ends, the results have not been conspicuously successful .

The

fact is that most of China's trade today rests on a commercialeconomic base.

It is carried on largely with the non-Communist

countries, including, may I add, many of our closest allies.
In short, to speak of China, today, as aggressively·
expansionist is to respond to Chinese words rather than Chinese
actions.

That is not to say that China will not

of threats tomorrow .

pose all manne2'

If there are not enough nightmares

already~

consider the prospects when China's nuclear capabilities will
have been extensively developed, along with a full-fledged intercontinental ballistic missile force.
Of course, there is an immens.e potential danger
in China; but there is also an immense potential danger in every

- 16 other powerful nation i n a wo rld whi ch has not yet learned how
to maintain civilized survival in a nuclear age except on the
razor's edge.

Insofar as China is concerned, the fundamental

question for us is not whether it is a danger, real or potential .
The fundamental question is whether our present policies act to
alleviate or t o exacerbate the danger.

Do we forestall the

dange r by joust ing with the shadows and suspicions of the past?
Do we help by a continuance in policies which do little if anything t o lift the heavy curtain of mutual ignorance and hostility?
Like it or not, the present Chinese government is
here to stay .

Like it or not, China is a major power in Asia and

is on the way to becoming a nuclear power .

Is it, therefore, in

this nation's interest and in the i nterest

of world peace to put

aside, once and for all, what have been the persistent but futile
attempts to isolate China?

Is it, therefore, in this nation's

i nterest and in the interest of world peace to try conscientiously
aEd consistently to do whatever we can do- - and, admittedly, it is
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not much-- to reshape the relationship with the Chinese along more
constructive and stable lines?

In short, is it propitious fo r

this n ation to try to do what, in fact , the policies of most of
the other Western democracies have already long since done r egar d ing their Chinese relationships?
I must say t hat the deepening of the conflict in
Viet Nam makes more difficult adjustments in policies respecting
China .

Indeed, the present

co~rse

of events in Viet Nam almost

insures that there shall be no changes .

It is not easy to con -

template an alleviation with any nation which cheers on those
who are engaged in inflicting casualties on Amricans .

Yet, it

may well be that this alleviation is an essential aspect of ending the vJar and, hence, American casualties .

That consideration,

alone, it seems to me, makes desirable initiatives towards China
at this time .
There are several obvious areas in which these
initiatives would have relevance .

Discriminatory restriction
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on travel to China, for example, is certainly one of these areas.
The Chinese may or may not admit Americans to their country, as
they choose.

But it is difficult t o understand why our own

government should in any way, shape, or form seek to stand in the
way of the attempts of American citizens to breech the great wall
of estrangement between the two nations .
that during the past three years

~here

It is, indeed, iron ic

have been more visits of

Americans t o North Viet Nam, a nation with which we are

~t

war,

than to China in the past thirteen years .
On the question of travel, it should be recalled
that the Chinese were the first to suggest in 1956 that American
journalists visit China.

The suggestion was summarily rejected

by the then Secretary of State .

When, later , it was decided to

accept the suggestion, the Chinese had changed their minds.
Since that time, thjs nation has been more inclined to ease the
travel barriers, on the basis of offi cial agr eement for exchanges
of persons, but the Chinese have shown no disposition to enter
into agreements or, for that matter, to admit Americans on any
basis .
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In any event, it seems to me tha t it is in the
positive interest of this nation to encourage Americans, if they
can gain entry, to travel to China .

May I add, I refer not merely

to the travel of selected journalists, doctors, and other speci alists, as is now the policy, but to the travel of any responsible
American<

In the same fashion, it seems to me most appropriate

to admit Chinese travelers to the United States under the same
conditions that pertain to visitors from other Communist countries .
T~ade

is ano t her area iL which long-standing poli -

cies respecting Chi na &re open to seriow.s question.

Technically,

this country still maintains an emba:-go on all trade with China .
The basis for this policy is compliance with a voluntary resolution of the United Nations which was adopte d at our behest at the
time of the Korea::1 conflict.

It is doubtful that the resolut1on

ever carried much weight among the trading nations of the world.
In any case, it has long since been forgotten .

Today, the princi-

pal nations in the Chj_na trade in rough order of importance

e.r~;

-

29 -

the United Kingdom, Japan, the Soviet Union, West Germany,
Australia, Canada, Italy, and France.

Of all the great maritime

nations, the United States alone clings to a total trade embargo
with China.

Moreover, we are also the only

nation in the

world which makes an effort to enforce what can best be described
as a kind of secondary boycott of re-exported Chinese products.
These policies have had little visible economic
impact, but they have had the most

se~ious

political repercussions.

It is conceivable that, to the Chinese, the policies are something
of an irritant.

To friendly nations, however, they have been a

source of c onstant friction.

Most serious, their continuance

over the years has injected unnec essary venom into the atmosphere

of U. S.-Chinese relations.
Nor

ca~

it be said that the situation in Viet Nam

has compelled the pursuit of the embargo and boycott.

The fact

is th2t these restrictions were in place before most Americans
ever heard of Viet Nam, and, certainly, long before Americans
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became involved in the war.

If the Vietnamese conflict is now

seen as justifi cation for leaving these policies undisturbed,
what is to be said of the existing attitude toward trade with
other Communist countri es?
The fact is that the European Communists are prov i ding North Vi et Nam and the Viet

Co~g

with sophisticated mili-

tary equipment which, from all repo rts, exceeds in value the
ass i sta nce which comes from China,
meaningful to permit and even to

On what basis, then, is it

enco~r a ge

non-strategic t r ade

wi th the European Communist countrie s while holdi ng to a closeddoor policy on trade with China?
served by the distinct i on?

1iJhat constructive purpose is

Any rationalization of rela tions with

China, it seems to me, will require an adjustment of thi s dual
approach .

We need to move in the direction of equal treatment

of all Communist nations in trade matters, whatever that treat ment ma y be.

- 22' -

In any event, problems of travel and trade are
secondary obstacles in the development of a more stable relat ionship between China and the United States .
mo r e significant difficulties.

There are other far

I refer, principally, to the

question of Taiwan and to the war in Viet Nam.
There is no doubt that the Chinese government seeks
in v:et Nama government which is friendly, if not subservient .
Peking has not concealed, moreover, its desire for the withdrawal
of American military power from Southeast Asta .

It does not

f8llow, however, that the price of peace in Southeast Asia is
either Chinese domination or U. S. military intervention.

That

is a black and white oversimplification of a gray situation . The
fact is that neither Burma on China's border nor Cambodia have
been "enslaved" by China, despite an association of many years,
despite periodic djfficulties with the great state to the north
and despite an absence of U. S . support, aid, or protection.

These two nations have managed to survive in a state of detachment from the power rivalries of the region.

Furthermore, China

is a signatory to the settlements which emerged from the Geneva
Conferences of 1954 and 1962 and which contain at least a hope
for a middle way to peace in Indo-China.

So far as I am aware,

the Chinese have not been found in direct or unilateral violation
of these agreements.

It is not impossible that a similar settle-

ment,with Chinese participation, might be reached on Viet Nam .
Indeed, it is to be devoutly hoped that there can
be a solution along these lines.

Unless it is found, there is

a very real danger--as the Korean experience shows--that the prolongation of war on China's frontiers may well bring about
another U. S. -Chinese armed confrontation.
Perhaps the most important element in the rebuilding of stable relations with China is to be found in a solution
of the problem of Taiwan.

It may help to come to grips with this

issue, if it is understood at the outset that the island of

-

Taiwan is Chin ese .

24 -

That is the position of the National Govern-

ment of t he Republic of China .
People ' s Re public of China .

That i s the position of t he

For a quarter of a century, this

common Chinese posi t ion has been reinforced by the policies and
actions of the United States government .
Since that is the case, I do not believe that a
solution to the Taiwan question is facilitated by its statement
in terms of a two - China policy, as has been suggested in some
quarters in recent years .

The fact is that there is one China

which happens to have been divided into two parts by events which
occurred a long time ago .
peace

betwee~

Key factors in the maintenance of

the separate segments have been the interposition

of U. S. military power in the Taiwan stra i ts, and the strengthening of the National Government of China by massive injections of
economic and military aid .
This course was followed by the United States for
many reasons, not the least of which was that it made possibl e

-

25-

a refuge for dedicated allies and associates in the war against
Japan .

Most of all, however, it was followed because to have

permitted the closing of the breech by a military clash of the
two opposing Chinese forces would have meant a massive bloodbath
and, in the end , the rekindling of another great war in Asia .
However, the situation has changed in the Western
Pacific .

Taiwan is no longer abjectly dependent for its survival

on the United States .

Some of the passions of the deep Chinese

political division have cooled with the passing of time .

Another

generation has appeared and new Chinese societies, in effect,
have grown up on both sides of the Tl iwan straits .
Is there not, then, some better way to confront
this problem than threat-and-counter-threat between island
Chinese and mainland Chinese?

Is there not some better way to

live with this situation than by the armed truce which depends,
in the last analysis, on the contj_nued presence of the U. S. 7th
Fleet in the Taiwan Straits?

-

2~ -

The questions cannot be answered until all
involved are prepared to take a fresh look at the situation .

It

seems to me that it might be helpful if there could be, among the
Chinese themselves, an exami nation of the possj_bilities of
improving the climate.

As I have already indicated, the proper

framework for any such consideration would be an acceptance of
the contention of both Chinese groups--that there is only one
China and Taiwan is a part of it .

In that context, the questions

at issue have to do with the dichotomous

si~uation

as between

mainland and island governments a nd the possibility of br inging
about

constr~ctive

changes therein by peaceful means.

There is no cause to be sanguine about the prospects of an approach of this kind .

One can only hope that ti'!le

may have helped to ripen the circumstances for settlement.

It

is apparent, for example, that the concept whi ch held the
Chinese government on Taiwan to be the sole hope of China's
redemption has grown less relevant with the years.

For Taiwan,

-

2.7-

therefore, to remain isolated from the mainland is to court the
risk that the island will be left once again, as it has been on
other occasions, in the backwash of Chinese history.
The removal of the wedge of separation, moreover,
would also seem to accord with the interests of the mainland
Chinese goverrunent.

It does have a legitimate concern in the

reassertion of the historic connection of Taiwan and China.

It

does have a concern in ending the hostile division which has
been costly and disruptive both within China and in China's
internat 1onal relationships.
FrCJm the point of view of the United States, too,
there is an interest in seeking a less tenuous situation.

Progresi

in settling the 'I'aiwan question could contribute to a general
relaxation of tensions in the Western Pacific and, conceivably,
even to resolution of the conflict i n Viet Nam.

Certainly, it

would make possible a reduction in the enormous and costly overall defense burdens which were assumed in Asian waters afte:r Wo --:·ld
l

,. .
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War II and which, two decades later, still rest on the shoulders
of this nat ion .
To sum up, then, it seems to me that the basic
adjustment which is needed in policies respecting China is to
make crystal clear that this government does not anticipate, much
less does it seek, the overthrow of the government of the Chinese
mainland .

In addition, there is a need t o end the discrimination

which consigns China to an inferior s tat·._,s as among the Communist
countri es in this nat ion 's policies respecting travel and trade.
Finally, it ought to be made uneq1.:ivocal that we are prepared at
all times t o meet with Chinese representatives --formally

o~

informally--in order to consider differences between China and
the United States over Viet Nam or any other question of common
concern .
Adjustments of this kind in the policies of the
nation, it seems to me, require above all else a fresh perspective .

We need to see the situation in Asia as it is today, not

-

:;19-

as it appeared twenty years ago in the Himalayan upheaval of the
Chinese revolution .

We need to see the situation

not through

the fog of an old and stagnant hostility but in the light of the
enduri~g

interests of the United States in the Western Pacific.
In this context we will setter be able to find

appropriate responses at appropriate times to the specific
problems of the Sino-U. S. relationship, whethe r they have to do
with U. N. representation or diplomatic recognition or the offshore islands or whatever.

Without prior adjustment i n perspec-

tive, however, to seek to deal definitively with these questions
would be, to say the least, an exercise in futility.
I should emphasize before concluding that it is
unlikely that there will be any eager Chinese responses to
initiatives on our part.

Nevertheless, I see nothing to be lost

for this nation in trying to move along the lines which have
been suggested.

Chinese intransigence is no license for American

intransigence .

-30
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Our stake in the situation in the Western Pacifi c

is too large for that sort of infantile indulgence .
I see great relevance in thinking deeply of the
issues which divide China and the United s·tates to see if they
can be recast in new and uncluttered molds.

'.!.,here is every

reason, especially for young people, to exa'"lline most closely the
premi ses of policy r egarding China which were enshrined almost
two decades ago .

The fact is that "Che b:rea.l<.down j_n Chinese-U.S.

relations was cne of the great failures of my generation and it
is highly doubtful that its full repair shall be seen in my lifetime.

The problem, therefore , will fall largely to you.

It is

not a particularly happy inheritance, but there is reason to hop2
that it may fare better i n your hands.
Ur..like my generation, you. know mo1:·e a"'..Jout Asia .
You have a greater awareness of its importance to this nation
and to the world.

ln 1942, four months afte r Pearl Ha rbor, for

example, a n opinion poll found that sixty pe:::·cent of a nationo.l

1
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sample of Americc.ns still could not locate either China or India
on an outline
case today.

rna~

of the world.

~rthermore,

national trauma

Certainly that would not be the

you have not had the experience of

in moving abruptly

f~om

an era marked by an

almost fawning benevolence toward China to one of thorough disenchantment.

You weYe spared the fierce hostilities which rent

this nation internally, as a sense of warmth, sympathy, and
security regarding China gave way to feelings of

rev~lsion,

hatred, and insecurity.
Your Chinese counterparts, the young people of
toC.ay's China--they are called the !IHeirs of the Revolut i on!f-have a similar gap to bridge as they look across the Pacific.
Your generation in China, too, has been contained and isolated,
a;,1d its view of the United States has been colored wi t!:l the hates
of another time.

It has had no contact with you or, indeeJ, with

much of the world outside China .

- ;J2 -

On the other hand, those young people have grown
up under easier conditions than the older generation of Chinese
who lived their youth in years of cont i nuous war and revolution.
It may be that they can face you and the rest of the world with
greater equanamity and assurance than has been the case at any
time in modern Chinese history.
I urge you to think for yourselves about China.
I urge you to approach, with a new objectivity, that vast nation,
with its great population of industrious and intelligent people.
Bear in mind that the peace of Asia and the world will depend on
China as much as it does on this nation, the Soviet Union, or any
other, not because China is Communist but because China is China-among the largest countries in the world and the most populous.
Mao Tse-Tung remarked in an interview several years
ago that "future events would be decided by future generations."
Insofar as his words involve the relationship of thi s nat ion and
China , whether they prove to be a prophecy of

d~om

or a

of a happier future will depend not so much on us , the

fo ~ eca st
11

0l d China.

Hand.s " of yesterday, but on you, the "New American Hands" of
tomorrow.

